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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CHEEVER and 
CHARLIE r,AROFOLO, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
ORVAL R. SCHRAMM and 
HAROLD L. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
************ 
Case No. 1Sl47 
APPEAL FROM A JUD'iMENT OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF lTTAH COUNTY, 
HONORABLE r,EOR<;E E. BALLIF, JUDGE. 
************ 
RAY M. HARDINr, 
Attorney for Appellants 
59 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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IN Tl!E SUPRF.>lE corwr 
OF TIIF STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CIILEVER and ) 
Cl!ARLIF CAROFOLO, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Respondents, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ORVAL SCJJRM1H and ) 
HAJIJ)Lfl L. CHRISTENSEN, ) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Appellants. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. 15147 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs as sellers 
of an automobile repair business against the defendants as 
buyers for hreach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court found a breach of contract on the 
part of defendants and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and respondents seek affirmance of the 
Judgment of the lower court and reasonable attorneys fees in 
connection with this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In their brief the defendants and appellants have 
restated the evidence presented to the court below in a light 
most favorahle to defendants' position and have failed to 
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adequately inc1icate the contrar)' l'Vjclci1cc' 1·11· ] · 
' 1 c 1 w :is Jn s liPPor· 
of the judgment made by the lo1vcr court. Consequently, 
plaintiffs and respondents hereby c;1ll the attent i •n of this 
Court to the fol lowinp facts supported hy the evidence in thl 
trial below: 
During or about the month of August 1975, plaintif'. 
began an automobile repair busjness under the name of cf, B 
Sports Car Service Center (Tr. S). At that time plaintiffs 
Sisken Investment Company construct a building for their ~e 
136 f:ast 100 South, Orem, Utah (Tr. 6), and plaintiffs enterr 
into a written five year lease with Sisken at ~725.00 permon· 
(Tr. 12, PI 's Ex # 4) . Plaintiffs borrowed $10,00f'.00 from 
Walker Bank g Trust Company with interest at 12.68% per annu: 
repayable in installments of ~267.46 per month (Tr. 8, Pl'si 
#2 and #3), which money was used to buy equipment and invento 
for the business (Tr. 8, CJ). The business progressed to the 
point where plaintiff Vern Cheever was required to spend ~fi 
time at it than he had anticipated and when the health of pl0 
tiff Charlie Garofolo became such that he was advised by his 
doctor to move to a warmer climate (Tr. 10), plaintiffs deci: 
to sell the business. The defendants subsequently responded 
a newspaper advertisement indicated that the business was~ 
sale early in January l 976 (Tr. 7, 13). Defendants talked 1 
plaintiffs about the business for several days, brought van' 
people to look over the facilities, inventoried the equipmen' 
supplies, read ancl reviewed the plaintiffs' lease agreement 
(Tr. 53, 69), and then on a Sun<lay afternoon, February 1, 19. 
- 2 -
• 
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c:irnc to the home of plaintiff Vernon Cheever and stated that 
they wanted to huy the business (Tr. 13-19, 40; Pl's Ex #7). 
Plaintifr Vern Cheever then made up an agreement (Pl's Ex #1) 
which was signed by the parties and defendants paid $200. 00 
earnest rnoncy to t 11e plaintiffs (Tr. 17). Defendants actually 
took over the husiness operation on February 9, 1976, including 
all cq11ipment, records and the Walker Bank loan payment book, 
hut for the week prior thereto defendants worked in the operation 
with plaintiffs so that they, the defendants, might familiarize 
themselves with the business and its operation (Tr. 19, 20). 
Plaintiffs, thems0lves, also worked with defendants for the week 
following February 9, 1976, to help the defendants get better 
acquainted with the operation of the business (Tr. 13). Defendants 
operated the business until February 18, 1976, when they paid 
to the plaintiffs the balance of the cash involved in the sell-
ing price (Tr. 21). 
At the time defendants took over, the business was 
good (Tr. 24). Prior to the take over, plaintiffs were paying 
their mechanics 50% of the labor charged to customers or $100.00 
per week, whichever was greater, and this was reflected in the 
business records exhibited to the defendants (Tr. 24, 25). 
Plaintiffs, after the take over of the business by 
the defendants, and pursuant to the sales agreement, arranged 
for a new lease to be prepared which was identical to plaintiffs' 
lease, except that the defendants were shown as lessees (Tr. 25, 
45-4 7). When the lease was presented to the defendants, defendants 
objected to a provision requiring a second mortgage on defendants' 
- 3-
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homes to secure the lease payments even though plaintiffs' 1, 
did contain such a provision (Tr. 2fi, 48). l'l<J1ntiffs then 
arrangecl to have the mortgage provision stricken from the 1 c. 
which amendment was then appro· ad by the J (1' 
_ essor r. 2(1, 27, 
42, 91), and the revised lease agreement was then del ivcred t 
the defendants· for their signatures (Tr. 27, SO). Defendants 
refused to sign the lease personally and attempted to insist 
it be signed on behalf of C & R Sports Car Incorporated, a 
corporation formed by the defendants after execution of the 
agreement bet1;cen the parties (Tr. 73), and then after havin[ 
operated tbe business for approximately two months, defendant 
close<J the business 1v:ithout executing the lease agreement, tc 
all of the equipment away from the premises, returned the Wal 
Bank payment book to the plaintiffs and dismissed the employ( 
of the ~usiness (Tr. 28-33). Thereupon, plaintiffs became 
obligec1 to respond to the claims of 1\lalkcr Rank fi Trust Comp: 
for the business loan previously taken out and ivhich ivas toi 
been assumed by the defenclants, and the plaintiffs also were 
held liable to Sisken for the lease payments which were to h 
been assumed by the dcfenc1ants. After defendants vacated th 
premises, the business was no longer viable because defendan 
had stripped the building of all equipment and inventor)' (Tr 
36, Pl's Ex #Sand #6). 
After defendants' refusal to sign the lease with S 
vacated the premises, ancl closerl the business, the neH lease 
which had been prepared hy Sisken for defcn,lants to sign 1135 
destroyed hy Siskcn (Tr. 57). 
- 4 -
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Plaintiffs thereupon brought suit against the defendants 
to recover damages. After trial of the matter, the court below 
awarclccl plaintiffs damages against the defendants in the sum of 
$12,110.31 together with $1250.00 attorneys' fees and costs of 
court in the amount of ~29.60, making an aggregate judgment in 
the sum of $13~389.91 (R 39-40). 
POINT I 
TliE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
HATl BEC:mtE FULLY BOUND BY THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
As hereinabove pointed out, the defendants have restated 
the evirlence presented to the court below in a light most favorable 
to defendants' position and they have failed to indicate the ample 
contrary evidence which was in support of the decision made by 
the trial court. The rule is clear that on appeal, the appellate 
court must determine whether there is credible evidence to support 
the decision below and, if so, that judgment must stand even 
though there may be some dispute in the evidence (Pollesche v. 
Transamerica Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P. 2d 236). 
The plaintiffs having prevailed in the court below, they are 
entitled to the benefit of the evidence viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, together with every inference 
and intendment fairly and reasonably arising therefrom (Bountiful 
v. Swift, 535 P. 2cl 1236; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 
2d 680; Jaeger and Branch Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 433 P. 
2d 605; Mccarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P. 2d 732; 
~um v. Clothier, 121 l!tah 311, 241 P. 2d 468; Nasner v. 
~, 2 Utah 2d 236, 272 P. 2d 163). 
- 5-
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Defendants contend that the contract between the pa: 
was never implemented. The contrary is obvious. De fenclants , 
over the business completely <md operatecl the s~nne for appro, 
mately two months; they macle a payment on the Wa1Lcr Bank loar 
(Tr. 11, 23); credit cards \vere cho.nged into thcj r names (Tr. 
defendants hired and paid their own cmn1oyees (Tr. f.2); they 
made a lease payment to Sisken (Tr. 34); and although the 
defendants did not actually enter into a written lease arru~ 
Jllent directly with Sisken, such failure was due entirely to ti 
actions of defendants in that they wrongfully attempted to in 
that the lease be signed by C fr B Sports Car Incorporated (Tr 
rather than by defendants personally as contemplated in the 
original agreement (PJ's Ex #1). The evidence is clear that 
defendants were offered a lease by Sisken according to the te· 
of the original agreement (Tr. 47-50), and it was the defenda 
themselves, who wrongfully fail.eel to execute the same as les' 
Defendants refer to Line 35 of Plaintiff·s' Exhibit 
and now co:r1plain that there was no further instrument of con> 
ance executed, when as a matter of fact all inventory and equ 
ment was turned over to and accepted by defendants on Februai 
1976 (Tr. 19), and defendants claimed and removed the same a; 
their own property completely when defendants strioped and~ 
the business premises on or alrnut Apri] 1, 1976 (Tr. 32, 33). 
Defendants became fully possessed and vested with the inventi-
and equipment and their title to the sa111.: is not in dis11ute. 
agreement of the parties in thal respect was fully consummatt 
The performance of a condition precedent to the formation of 
- 6-
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contract may be waived either expressly orb ·d Y acts ev1 encing 
such intention, and the perforfllance of any condition precedent 
to the taking effect of the contract between the parties to this 
action was clearly waived by defendants in treating the agreement 
as being rn full force and effect (Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah 
465, 22CJ P. 2d·296). 
Defendants further say that the agreement between the 
parties never became effective because defendants were not furnished 
an inventory of assets. The fact is they took their own inventory 
(Tr. 14-t!O) which was later confirmed in writing on February 18, 
1976 (Tr. 23, Pl's Ex #22, Tr. 31, Pl's Ex #23), and as above 
inclicatc<l, defendants had no difficulty in identifying assets 
when they stripped the building on or about April 1, 1976. 
Defendants have made no claim at any time, either at the trial 
or in connection with this appeal, that they did not get every 
item of inventory and equipment that they bargained for. 
With respect to defendants' contentions that the 
agreement did not become operative because plaintiff Charlie 
Garofolo did not provide thirty to forty-five days of assistance 
after defendants took over the business, the evidence is uncon-
tradictcd that defendants waived any such stipulation shortly 
after defendants took over the business by telling Mr. Garofolo 
that they did not want him to continue working in the business 
(Tr. 21, 104). 
Defendants, in passing, have alluded to alleged 
heresay testimony concerning whether Sisken ever was willing to 
accept the defendants as tenants. The record is replete with 
- 7-
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testimony by 1'lr. R01vley, agent for Siskcn, <lllcl oth~i·c.··, tl 
' ·' lat t 
offered lease was signecl on hchn1 f of Sjskon b}' Warnc 1· flurp!iv, 
its principal of{icer, anrl \\'as suh111ittec1 to dcf<'ndants for ti 
signatures (Tr. 26, ?.7, 4S-SO). 1n <iny event, clo Fcnclants ma; 
no objection to the testimony about 1vhich they complain ivhen 
was offered at· the trial (Tr. 26). 
POINT II 
TIIE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULINr; THAT THER.E ii[ 
NO FRAUDULENT RF.PRESENT1\TIONS Hi\DE BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A party allc,ging fraud and rnisrcpresentation niust 
prove such assertions by clear and convincing evidence (Unive 
CIT Credit Cornoration v. Sohm, lS Utah 2d 262, 391 P. Zd 29: 
Tibbits Y_s . 0 pens haw , 1 8 Utah 2 cl 4 1t 2 , 4 2 S P . 2 d 16 0) . In th: 
case each item of alleged misrepresentation attributed tot~ 
plaintiffs is controverted by valid and believable evidence t 
the contrary, which the court he low chose to believe. This 
evidence as to each alleged point is as follows: 
1. \'Ii th respect to the charge that defendants weri 
told hy plaiTJtiffs that the business was grossing approximate 
$10,000.00 per month, the record is clear that plaintiff ~rr 
Cheever showed the books and records of the company to the 
defendants, discussed the same with the defendants (Tr. 18, 
Pl' s Ex # 7), and even he] peel de fen clan ts set up their own rec 
(Tr. 23). Defendants worked 1vi th plaintiffs in the business 
a week before defendants took over (Tr. 19, 20), and then 
J ft tab: defendants operated the business for another wee' a• er 
(Tr. 
over before making another cash payment on tho contract 
- 8 -
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defendants well knew that the business had gross income for 
the entire year of 1975 of approximately $10,000.00 as shown 
by plaintiffs' records exhibited to the defendants (Pl's Ex #7) 
and not Sl0,000.00 per month. 
2. As to the advertising practices of the plaintiffs, 
this was discussed with the defendants (Tr. 16). There is no 
evidence in the record to refute the fact that plaintiffs, 
while they were operating the business, did terminate their 
advertising from time to time. Likewise, defendants have offer-
ed no testimony to refute plaintiffs' statement that the defend-
ants were advised at the outset to begin their own advertising 
program (Tr. 16) and in fact, plaintiff Vern Cheever attempted 
to encourage defendants to commence an advertising program 
(Tr. 23, 211). 
3. Defendants allege they were misinformed about 
how the mechanics were paid; however, defendants had full access 
to the company books (Pl's Ex #7) showing how the employees 
were paid and defendants were informed how plaintiffs paid 
their mechanics (Tr. 24, 25). Defendants were under no obliga-
tion to hire any particular mechanic, and in fact did choose 
to hire two of those previously employed by plaintiffs on the 
same basis of pay as paid by the plaintiffs (Tr. 61, 62). 
4. Regarding the loan from Walker Bank & Trust 
Company, defendants were informed that the original loan was 
for $ln,ooo.oo with interest at approximately 12-1/2% per annum, 
payable at ~267.46 per month (Tr. 8; Pl's Ex #2). This informa-
tion was reflected in the company books which defendants 
- 9-
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inspected (Pl's Ex 117) ancl \Vas co11n11unic:tcc1 to clclcnclants 
by p1aintiff Vern Cheever (Tr. lS, 16). Tn allclition, <lcfcnd-
ants took possession of the p;1y111cnt hook (Pl 's Ex /!_<;) and mo<l 
at least one payment thereon (Tr. J l). ll8fcndz. ts 1-:en~ not 
misinforinecl ab<)ut the particul;-irs of the 10011 1, he assumed C: 
them and the cburt below correctly so concluded. 
S. The CYidence with respect to allegations as to 
the value of the inventory and equipment is at least in confl 
Plaintiff Vern Cheever testi fi eel that plaintiffs clicl not assi 
a particular value, item by ite1ri, at the outset, nor was any 
request made by defendants for such a valuation ("Jr. 14, 15). 
The business was offered for the aggregate price of ~6,000.01· 
cash, plus assumption of the loan at \l/alker Bank 8 Trust Cor1r 
and the lease 1vith Sisken. Defendants fully inspected the 
inventory and equipment, the company hooks and records, and 
participated in the operation of tl10 business "for at least t, 
weeks before paying the purchase price. 
The claims of fraud and Jltisrepresentation are not 
supported by the evidence and certainly not in any event by 
clear and convincing evidence as required under the law. 
POINT II I 
PLAINTIFFS, AS THE PRF.\TATL1l\JG PARTIES, ARE E'-JTITL[ 
TO Al\! A\'IA1rn OF ADDITIONAL Rf:ASONABLI'. ATTORNT'Y FEES IN 
CONNECTION \I/ITH TIIIS APPEAL. 
By the terms of the agreement between the pnrties, 
- - ff are the defendants having breached the same, the pJ;-irnti. s 
entitled to an award for expens0s 
. - tl1 incurred Ln "en lorcing 
- ] () -
« 
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agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, 
including a reasonable attorneys' fee" (Pl's Ex #1). The court 
helO\v awardecl plaj nti ffs attorneys' fees incident to the trial 
ol the case (Tr. 6S, 66; R 40, 49). The plaintiffs have incur-
red further expenses as attorneys' fees incident to the defense 
of this appeal· and matters subsequent to the trial below in 
an amount of at least $7SO.OO. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled 
to an <H1di tional award in such an amount (Swain v. Salt Lake 
Ci tt Real Fstate and Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 
Zll 7 0()). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs sold a viable, growing business to 
defendants and within two months.defendants wrongfully closed 
the same, stripped the premises of all inventory and equipment 
and left plaintiffs with a defunct operation, a loan obligation 
to Walker Bank & Trust Company, and a leasehold liability to 
Sisken. The judgment and damages awarded plaintiffs against 
the defendants by the court below should be sustained and the 
plaintiffs should be awarded additional attorneys' fees of 
$750.00 as expenses incident to this appeal pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement between the parties. 
-11-
Respectfully submitted, 
ristensen, for 
, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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CERTIFICl\TF nr: ~!f\ILL'H~ 
Two copies of the foregoing '"ere i11ailed, postage 
prepaid, to Ray !II. Harding, attorney for defenclants and appeJ 
59 West ~,lain Street, J\E1crican l,'ork, Utah 84003, this ... 2/! 
of July, 1977. 
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